Trade Lane Megacities / Internacionalización / Migraciones. Recopilación de enlaces julio 2014 (2).

En esta ocasión, cumplimos a rajatabla la regla de los 10 puntos. Algunos enlaces muy interesantes…

1. Internacionalización: Import /Sport, audiencia Mundial 2014.

¿ Europa ?

APTOPIX MLS Timbers Sounders Soccer

No EEUU: premiliminares del Seattle Sounders vs. Portland Timbers, dos equipos de la MLS.

[Nota la margen: joer, había puesto vs. Pittsburg Timbers, lo cual no tiene ningún sentido, primero porque no existe ningún equipo con este nombre y segundo porque posiblemente Seattle y Pittsburg no jueguen en la misma liga, pues uno está en el este y el otro en el oeste…:-); estaba recibiendo muchas visitas, ahora ya se por qué)

¡¡ Menos mal que no he dicho que era mi equipo preferido !!.No lo es. Es este. Fuente de la fotografía: The Guardian].

a) Audiencia Global del Mundial 2014 antes de la final con datos de anteriores Mundiales.

b) Audiencia Global 1 día después de la final. Pero ojo, todavía no hay un dato agregado total. Tardan más de lo que esperaba.

Extracto.

The fully audited global figures for Sunday’s match will not be known for some time but broadcasters are already optimistic that the numbers may approach or even surpass the 909 million who watched the Spain v Netherlands final in 2010.

c) EEUU 1.

Extracto. 

Aproximadamente 26,5 millones de personas en Estados Unidos vieron a Alemania derrotar en tiempo extra a Argentina el domingo por la tarde, informó la compañía Nielsen, especialista en medir audiencias. La transmisión de ABC fue vista por 17,3 millones de personas, mientras que otros 9,2 millones siguieron la de Univisión, en español.

La final de 2010, jugada por España y Holanda, junto con el empate entre la selección de Estados Unidos y la de Portugal, en las primeras etapas del torneo de Brasil, tuvieron 24,7 millones de televidentes cada una.

El promedio de audiencia para las 64 partidos del torneo subió 39% respecto a 2010 en ESPN y su estación hermana, ABC, y 34% para Univisión, señaló Nielsen.

EEUU 2.

Extracto.

Sean Brown, a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard who has studied the sociology of sports, detected a distinct shift in the American media narrative during the World Cup. In previous tournaments, he said, the attitude of the US press had changed “from ‘this is an event that no-one cares about’ to ‘this is an event that we kinda care about’.” He told the Guardian that during this year’s tournament, the narrative shifted to “this is finally the moment that soccer is making it; this is the tipping point”.

La pregunta del  millón es si este interés y audiencia del Mundial se podrá trasladar a la liga local la MLS.

Brown agreed about the coming audience drop, but thought this would be largely a good thing. “As I see it,” he said, “soccer is growing slowly, and that’s the right way for it to grow permanently. I don’t think the MLS will see a large ratings boost based on World Cup numbers. But the MLS is growing anyway.”

Dan Courtemanche is executive vice-president of Major League Soccer, and has been with the organisation for 16 out of its 19 seasons. He points to figures by Scarborough research that show support for league soccer in the US almost doubling since 2006, from 48 million to 70 million.

d) UK

Extracto.

The World Cup set a new ratings record as Germany defeated Argentina in the final.

34.65million viewers tuned in to watch the action, say UK TV Ratings, the biggest UK audience since the London 2012 closing ceremony.

e) Canada.

Extracto.

Sin embargo, el 89% de la población del país (alrededor de 30,7 millones) vio al menos parte de un juego del torneo que terminó el pasado domingo. Esto representa un aumento en relación al Mundial de 2010, que captó la atención del 86% de la población.

El punto máximo de audiencia -como era de esperarse- fue la final entre Alemania y Argentina, la cual tuvo una audiencia promedio de 4,93 millones de televidentes. El pico fue de 7,4 millones alrededor de las 5:35 pm y en total se estima que 11,3 millones de canadienses vieron al menos parte de la transmisión en inglés de la final.

Esto significa que la final del Mundial fue vista por una mayor cantidad de personas que la final de laGrey Cup del Fútbol Canadiense de 2013, que el Clásico de Invierno de la NHL e incluso que el último partido de la pasada final de la Copa Stanley.

f) Varios.

Germany: an all-time-high audience of 41.89 million viewers tuned in to watch their national team win the World Cup (86.3% share). An online survey conducted on early Sunday evening suggested that an additional 12 million Germans cheered the game in a public space.

 Belgium: the TV viewing record set during the match against South Korea was broken during the Red Devils’ win over the US team. It became the most watched football match in the history of Belgian television with 5.5 million viewers (85% TV audience).

The Netherlands: the semi-final against Argentina has set a new record of 12.4 million viewers including out-of-home viewing (89.3% share). The game triggered 158,192 tweets.

France: the 0-1 win for Germany reached an audience of 16.9 million people (72.1% share). The game scored more than one million related tweets.

Sweden: the final game was the most viewed match of the World Cup 2014 with 2.58 million viewers (73.84% share)

Poland: the final achieved the biggest Polish TV audience since 2012: 10.56 million (63.43% share).

Portugal: the match against the US attracted 3.6 million viewers (75.4% share). It was the second most viewed broadcast in Portugal since March 2012.

Hungary: the final attracted 1.86 million Hungarians to their TV screens (47.8% share).

Austria: whereas Brazil’s defeat by Germany was watched by 1.36 million viewers (52% audience share), the final game reached a record audience of 1.81 million viewers (55.3% making it the highest rated football in Austria since the Euro 2008.

Ireland: the final scored a TV audience of 857,000 people (55.73% share) and the total world cup triggered 2.5 million online streams. Looking specifically at adults 15-34, the final also ranks as the number one programme this year to-date across all channels.

Italy: the Uruguay game reached a total of 19.19 million viewers (81.5% share).

Romania: the highest TV audience share for this World Cup was reported for the final match: 43%.

Argentina: 63.7% of the Argentinian TV audience watched their national team being defeated by Germany in the finals.

El dato agregado global está tardando más de lo que esperaba. Justo antes de la final había expectativas de superar los 1000 millones de teleespectadores. Cuando aparezca el dato actualizaré y seguramente dejaré de publicar sobre este tema hasta el siguiente Mundial, si es que el blog sigue activo.

g) Seguimiento en redes sociales.

Redes 1

Redes 2.

2. Trade Lane Megacities. Libro sobre puertos, ciudades y cadenas de suministro.

Ports, Cities, and Global Supply Chains

  • Global trends in policy and technology related fields are rapidly reshaping the port industry worldwide. International in scope, this volume provides multidisciplinary insights into the role port cities adopt in dealing with global supply chains. Throughout the book, concepts of strategic management, supply chain management, port and transport economics and economic and transport geography are applied to offer an in-depth understanding of the processes underlying global supply chains and associated spatial and functional dynamics in port-cities. The book also discusses policy outcomes and implications relevant to port-cities positioned in different segments of global supply chains.
  • Contents: Introduction, James Wang, Daniel Olivier, Theo Notteboom and Brian Slack. Part 1 Conceptualization of Port-Cities and Global Supply Chains: Supply chain and supply chain management: appropriate concepts for maritime studies, Valentina Carbone and Elisabeth Gouvernal; Global supply chain integration and competitiveness of port terminals, Photis M. Panayides; The terminalisation of seaports, Brian Slack; Re-assessing port-hinterland relationships in the context of global supply chains, Theo Notteboom and Jean-Paul Rodrigue. Part 2 Shipping Networks and Port Development: The development of global container transhipment terminals, Alfred J. Baird; Mediterranean ports in the global network: how to make the hub and spoke paradigm sustainable?, Enrico Musso and Francesco Parola; Northern European range: shipping line concentration and port hierarchy, Antoine Frémont and Martin Soppé; Factors influencing the landward movement of containers: the cases of Halifax and Vancouver, Robert J. McCalla. Part 3 Inserting Port-Cities into Global Supply Chains: Globalization and the port-urban interface: conflicts and opportunities, Yehuda Hayuth; A metageography of port-city relationships, César Ducruet; Chinese port-cities in the global supply chains, James Wang and Daniel Olivier; The economic performance of seaport regions, Peter W. De Langen. Part 4 Corporate Perspectives on the Insertion of Ports in Global Supply Chains: The success of Asian container port operators: the role of information technology, Daniel Olivier and Francesco Parola; Which link in which chain? Inserting Durban into global automotive supply chains, Peter V. Hall and Glen Robbins; Sustainable development and corporate strategies of the maritime industry, Claude Comtois and Brian Slack; References; Index.

3. Trade Lane Megacities. Increible paper, ¡¡Muy interesante !!

Growth in cities and countries.

Abstract. A large micro literature has documented the local forces leading to growth and decline of cities. This paper measures the consequences of these local forces on aggregate output and welfare. We use a Rosen-Roback model of urban growth to show that a summary statistic for the aggregate effect of local growth (decline) is whether it shows up as an increase (decrease) in local employment or as an increase (decrease) in the nominal wage relative to other cities. Differences in the nominal wage across cities reflect differences in the marginal product of labor across cities which, ceteris paribus, lower aggregate output. We show that the dispersion of the average nominal wage across US cities increased from 1964 to 2009 and may be responsible for a 13% decline in aggregate output. Changes in amenities appear to account for only a small fraction of this output loss, with most of the loss likely caused by increased constraints to housing supply in highly productive cities. We conclude that welfare gains from spatial reallocation of the US labor force are likely to be substantial

Extractos. 

Our starting point is the observation that if labor is significantly more productive in some areas than in others, then aggregate output may be increased by reallocating some workers from low productivity areas to high productivity ones. For example, in 2009 average nominal wages
in San Jose, CA and Boston, MA were twice as large as nominal wages in Brownsville, TX and Flint, MI, after conditioning on education and demographics, presumably because the marginal product of labor in San Jose and Boston is twice as large. If some workers were moved from
Brownsville and Flint to San Jose or Boston, U.S. GDP would increase, because more workers would have access to whatever productive factor generates high productivity in San Jose and Boston. To maximize aggregate output, one would need to continue reallocating workers until the marginal product of labor and nominal wages are equalized across cities. But of course, the potential output gains do not necessarily translate into welfare gains. The implications for welfare hinge upon the reasons why wages are not equalized across cities in the first place.

These output effects are driven by two broad regional trends. On the one hand, six cities that we will call “innovation clusters” — New York, Washington, Boston, San Francisco, San Jose and Seattle — experienced some of the strongest growth in labor demand over the last four decades, but most of the labor demand was manifested as higher nominal wages (Moretti, 2012) instead of higher employment. On the other hand, Southern cities have also experienced rapid output growth, but most of this growth showed up as employment growth and only a small amount as an increase in the nominal wage. Since wages in Sun Belt cities were generally below the nationwide average in 1964, the growth in nominal wages in these cities lowered overall wage dispersion. The effect of wage growth in the Southern cities is smaller than the effect of higher wage dispersion driven by higher nominal wages in the innovation clusters, but the increase in overall wage dispersion from 1964 to 2009 would have been even larger if it had not been for the Southern cities.

In the final part of the paper we turn to welfare. Why is US labor not flowing to high TFP cities to the point that wages are equalized across cities?

If the relative increase in nominal wages in high TFP cities such as San
Francisco and New York is due to increased restrictions to housing supply, then the aggregate output loss due to differences in the marginal product of labor also imply welfare losses. In this case, removing constraint to housing supply in cities like San Francisco and New York would allow more workers to move there and take advantage of their higher productivity, pushing down local wages and increasing both aggregate output and welfare. In contrast, if labor supply in New York and San Francisco is low because of undesirable local amenities, then the loss in aggregate output from the gaps in the marginal product of labor does not necessarily reflect a decline in welfare. For example, if equilibrium nominal wages in New York are high because people dislike congestion noise and pollution and need to be compensated for it, then moving more people to New York will increase aggregate output, but will lower welfare.

In contrast, increasing the elasticity of housing supply in New York, Washington, Boston, San Francisco, San Jose and Seattle by 25% (a large increase) would reduce dispersion in nominal wages and increase U.S. output, accounting for the majority of the output gains in our counterfactual.

4. Migraciones.

Migraciones y economía como disciplinas de estudio.

5. Trade Lane Megacities. Inversiones en los puertos de la India.

Quizás esta temática hubiese merecido una entrada independiente y es posible que la hagamos en algún momento. Ahora tenemos sobrecarga.

The proposed projects include the implementation of special economic zones (SEZs) which will be developed at Kandla Port (Gujarat) and Jawaharlal Nehru Port (Mumbay)

“A policy for encouraging the growth of Indian controlled tonnage will be formulated to ensure an increase in employment of the Indian seafarers; development of ports is critical for boosting trade,” Jaitley told the lower-house of India’s parliament, as he presented the Union Budget.

India Today reported that the finance minister has pledged to allocate US$1.93 billion for the primary stage of an outer-harbour project in Tuticorin.

Additionally, Jaitley proposed an allocation of US$700 million for a project to develop inland waterways which has been titled ‘Jal Marg Vikas’.

The vast allocation to India’s port industry and waterway infrastructure displays the importance of India’s growing economy.

No muy lejos de Tuticorin nos encontramos a la ciudad de Trivandrum o Thiruvananthapuram dónde se está ejecutando un megaproyecto de puerto, el de Vizhinjam Container Transshipment Terminal. Aquí puedes encontrar una larga discusión sobre este proyecto / puerto en un foro (me alegra ver que no soy el único interesado en estos temas).

6. Internacionalización. El comercio intercontinental en el 2000 según The Economist.

De interés ya histórico.

7. Trade Lane Megacities. La situación de Italia como centro logístico.

8. Migraciones. De Senegal  a España.

Seguramente hablan de casos extremos. Yo conozco a algunos casos muy diferentes a los que cuentan que no creo que sean extremos…

9. Geopolítica. Entrevista a Brzezinski. 

Vamos a empezar a documentarnos sobre la situación geopolítica para extraer las consecuencias  en este aspecto de la hipótesis Trade Lane Megacities.

Todavía no tengo muy claro como enfocar el tema aunque obviamente tendrá una proyección geográfica: identificación de los bloques con intereses similares (por ejemplo, por citar algunos que se me ocurren ahora mismo: EEUU y sus satélites como la UE; BRICS; zona Islámica, países bolivaristas y otros; ninguno de estos “bloques” es monolítico y algunos incluso parecen vaporosos) y de sus áreas de influencia geográficas y la relación de estos y estas con las diferentes Rutas logísticas.

Quede claro que no nos interesa tanto la geopolítica en sí como su relación con la geoeconomía, o concretamente con las rutas logísticas internacionales de mercancías. Aunque en lo relativo a los flujos de mercancías, localización de la producción etc…, el trazado de la Ruta Central es altamente relevante, no tengo claro que suceda lo mismo en geopolítica y esto es lo que tenemos que averiguar. En cualquier caso para nosotros la relación de causa a efecto sería

                                    rutas logísticas–>geopolítica.

De momento  vamos a ir recopilando información. Comenzamos con una entrevista a un experto/personaje clásico de las relaciones internacionales de EEUU, y con un mapa de los conflictos internacionales en 2013, al que hemos añadido nuestro sello particular: la Ruta Central con sus diferentes variantes atlánticas (norte, centro y una hipotética sur que uniría Amazonas con África Occidental), los ramales, los nodos principales realeso hipotéticos, y una hipotética Ruta del  Sur, cuyo trazado no está nada claro y que si emerge alguna vez tardará, pues en muchas partes carece de momento de hinterland potente como para justificar Rutas Trasatlánticas. Pulsando se puede agrandar.

Debajo un segundo mapa que el lector habitual del blog ya conocerá. Es interesante pues aparecen las zonas de transbordo de mercancías (indicadas en círculos de color naranja) que podrían tener relevancia geopolítica. De hecho es este mapa el que finalmente me decidió investigar más detalladamente sobre la relación Ruta Central con la  geopolítica.  En Azul la Ruta Central o circum-ecuatorial.

mapa-conflictobis

map_intermediary_markets

Los recientes incidentes (que no se explican si no han sido un accidente, y no parece ser el caso) y otros anteriores nos enseñan que estudiar este tipo de mapas de conflictos no es un ejercicio de interés teórico sino, a veces, altamente relevante desde el punto de vista de la seguridad personal.

Aunque a quien lea a diario la prensa le parezca todo lo contrario, teniendo en cuenta que somos ya casi 7.000 millones de habitantes y lo enorme que es la superficie del globo, los conflictos serios que hay no parecen tantos (hay algunos nuevos no reflejados en el  mapa). Así a primera vista, yo personalmente no veo tanto caos como Brzezinski. Al contrario veo que cada más  gente se concentra en competir de manera pacífica (económicamente), en tratar de ganarse la vida aplicando sus talentos y de pasárselo lo mejor posible en su tiempo libre. Igual es una primera impresión que iré corrigiendo a medida que tenga más datos.

10. El informe Global Go To Think tank de la Universidad de Pensilvania.

En linea con el punto anterior enlazamos a este estudio dónde aparece un ranking de los Think Tanks más influyentes, a nivel global y por áreas geográficas. Quede claro que no todos se dedican a estudiar  asuntos de geopolítica.

The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) at the University of Pennsylvania conducts research on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world. Often referred to as the “think tanks’ think tank,” TTCSP examines the evolving role and character of public policy research organizations. Over the last 25 years, the TTCSP has developed and led a series of global initiatives that have helped bridge the gap between knowledge and policy in critical policy areas such as international peace and security, globalization and governance, international economics, environmental issues, information and society, poverty alleviation, and healthcare and global health. These international collaborative efforts are designed to establish regional and international networks of policy institutes and communities that improve policy making while strengthening democratic institutions and civil societies around the world.

The TTCSP works with leading scholars and practitioners from think tanks and universities in a variety of collaborative efforts and programs, and produces the annual Global Go To Think Tank Index that ranks the world’s leading think tanks in a variety of categories. This is achieved with the help of a panel of over 1,900 peer institutions and experts from the print and electronic media, academia, public and private donor institutions, and governments around the world. We have strong relationships with leading think tanks around the world, and our annual Think Tank Index is used by academics, journalists, donors and the public to locate and connect with the leading centers of public policy research around the world. Our goal is to increase the profile and performance of think tanks and raise the public awareness of the important role think tanks play in governments and civil societies around the globe

Since its inception in 1989, the TTCSP has focused on collecting data and conducting research on think tank trends and the role think tanks play as civil society actors in the policymaking process. In 2007, the TTCSP developed and launched the global index of think tanks, which is designed to identify and recognize centers of excellence in all the major areas of public policy research and in every region of the world. To date TTCSP has provided technical assistance and capacity building programs in 81 countries. We are now working to create regional and global networks of think tanks in an effort to facilitate collaboration and the production of a modest yet achievable set of global public goods. Our goal is to create lasting institutional and state-level partnerships by engaging and mobilizing think tanks that have demonstrated their ability to produce high quality policy research and shape popular and elite opinion and actions for public good

El ranking tendrá un valor relativo, como todos, y seguramente estará anglo-sesgado, pero creo que es  una buena primera fuente para estas cuestiones de geopolítica. Algunos datos extraidos de este informe: en 2013 había un total de 6826 (en 2014 ya hay que añadir  uno más que posiblemente abandone el carro rápidamente :-))

–1984 en Norte América (México incluido).

–1818 en Europa (Rusia incluida).

–1201 en África.

–662 en Latam.

–612 África Subsahariana.

–511 Oriente Medio y Norte de África (Turquía, Irán y Turkmenistán incluidos).

–38 Oceanía (Indonesia incluida).

La partición geográfica es curiosa en algunos aspectos.

Por países, la mayoría de los de Norteamérica se corresponden a EEUU (1828). España no destaca en este aspecto: tiene 55 y es el país nº 21. A efectos comparativos, por ejemplo Argentina es el 7º con 137, Italia el 11º con 89, Kenya el nº 17 con 57, más que Nigeria que con 51 ocupa el puesto 25.

Los países de Europa Occidental (no necesariamente UE) que están entre los 25 primeros en número de Think Tanks suman 1059. Los BRICS suman un total de 985, aunque hay bastante contraste: los extremos son China con 426 (2º) y Brasil con 81 (13º). El tercero de lalista es UK con 287. Esto es seguramente un survival.

No tienen Think Tanks o no los han encontrado en: We have not been able to identify any think tanks operation in the following countries: Brunei, Macao, Turkmenistan, Monaco, San Marino, Anguila, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, French Guinea, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Salvo los dos que he señalado, no me sorprende.

Aunque habría que relativizar por población para una comparativa como es debido, a los Nodos Principales de la Ruta Central (reales o potenciales) que son independientes, no parece interesarles  en demasía la geopolítica: Japón 108, Países Bajos 57, España 55, Egipto 55, Marruecos 30, Hong Kong 30, Sri Lanka 14, Panamá 12, Singapur 6, Djibuti 1.

Algunos extractos de los Rankings:

Think Tank of the Year 2013 – Top Think Tank in the World
                         Brookings Institution (United States)

Top Think Tanks Worldwide (U.S. and non-U.S.).Extracto. 

1. Brookings Institution (United States)
2. Chatham House (United Kingdom)
3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (United States)
4. Center for Strategic and International Studies (United States)
5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Sweden)
6. Bruegel (Belgium)
7. Council on Foreign Relations (United States)
8. Rand Corporation (United States)
9. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (United Kingdom)
10. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (United States)

Top Think Tanks Worldwide (Non-U.S.). Extracto.

1. Chatham House (United Kingdom)
2. Bruegel (Belgium)
3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Sweden)
4. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (United Kingdom)
5. Transparency International (TI) (Germany)
6. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) (United Kingdom)
7. Amnesty International (United Kingdom)
8. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (Belgium)
9. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (China)
10. International Crisis Group (ICG) (Belgium)

No entiendo como es posible que en el ranking no USA aparezcan el FRIDE en el 76, pero en la lista conjunta USA y no USA aparezca  en el 72. ¿ Se utilizan criterios diferentes para la elaboración de ambos ?. Será una errata. En el siguiente listado aparecen los expertos en asuntos internacionales. Copiamos todos.

Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks.Lista completa. 

1. Brookings Institution (United States)
2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (United States)
3. Chatham House (CH) (United Kingdom)
4. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (United States)
5. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (United States)
6. German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) (Germany)
7. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Sweden)
8. China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) (China)
9. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (United Kingdom)
10. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) (United Kingdom)
11. French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) (France)
12. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (United States)
13. RAND Corporation (United States)
14. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Egypt)
15. Cato Institute (United States)
16. Transparency International (Germany)
17. Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (United States)
18. Center for American Progress (United States)
19. Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) (China )
20. Atlantic Council of the United States (United States)
21. Hoover Institution (United States)
22. International Crisis Group (ICG) (Belgium)
23. Heritage Foundation (United States)
24. Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) (Poland)
25. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) (Italy)
26. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (Norway)
27. Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) (France)
28. Australian Strategic Policy Institute (APSI) (Australia)
29. China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) (China)
30. Egmont Institute, Royal Institute for International Relations (Belgium)
31. Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Netherlands)
32. German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) (Germany)
33. Real Instituto Elcano, Elcano Royal Institute (Spain)
34. Institute for United States and Canada Studies, IMEMO-RAS (Russia)
35. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (United Kingdom)
36. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) (Poland)
37. Belgrade Center for Security Policy (FNA Center for Civil-Military Relations) (Serbia)
38. Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) (Russia). 

39. Peace and Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (Norway)
40. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Indonesia)
41. Hudson Institute (United States)
42. Human Rights Watch (United States)
43. Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) (Singapore)
44. Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) (Sweden)
45. Gulf Research Center (GRC) (Saudi Arabia and, Switzerland)

46. Center for Security and Defense Studies (Hungary)
47. Center for Strategic Studies (Jordan)
48. European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) (Belgium)
49. Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) (Singapore)
50. Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) (Sri Lanka)
51. Kofi Annan International Peace and Training Center (Ghana)
52. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (United States)
53. Institute for International Relations (IIR) (Czech Republic)
54. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (India)
55. East Asia Institute (Republic of Korea)
56. Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) (Singapore)
57. Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) (Czech Republic)
58. Strategic Studies Institute (South Africa)
59. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) (Greece)
60. Institute for National Security Studies (FNA) Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel)
61. Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Republic of Korea)
62. Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) (Malaysia)
63. Security and Defense Agenda (Belgium)
64. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) (South Africa)
65. Center for Democratic Development (Ghana)

 

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