El taller es concretamente sobre los aspectos económicos del acto de compartir información. Lo organizan conjuntamente el DIMACS y la Universidad de Stanford y el contenido de algunas de las presentaciones es interesante. Las siguientes entre otras. Puedes ver los abstract de todas ellas aquí.
—Title: Bottlenecks on the Internet and Platform Competition.
One of the central features of the internet is all of content published there. Incentives for content creation are partially determined by monetization received from online advertising. This talk will discuss how competition in internet search and in advertising platforms more broadly affects equilibrium industry structure in various sectors. The impacts of competition and internet innovation on search advertising market design, on the news industry, and on who benefits from personal data and how it is used will be considered.
—Title: The Limits of Price Discrimination
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the welfare consequences that result when a monopolist gains access to additional information about consumers’ tastes, beyond the prior distribution. The additional information may be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market. We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by additional information can achieve every combination of prot and consumer surplus such that 1) the monopolist’s prots are at least as high as under the prot maximizing policy without additional information, 2) consumer surplus is non-negative, and 3) total welfare does not exceed the surplus produced by socially efficient trade. Finally, we extend the analysis to account for the possibility of quantity and quality discrimination as well as a non-linear cost function.
—Title: Running a survey when privacy comes at a cost.
In this talk, we consider the problem of estimating a potentially sensitive (individually stigmatizing) statistic on a population. We suppose that individuals are concerned about their privacy, and experience some cost as a function of their privacy loss.
Nevertheless, they would be willing to participate in the survey if they were compensated for their privacy cost. These cost functions are not publicly known, however, nor do we make Bayesian assumptions about their form or distribution. Individuals are rational and will misreport their costs for privacy if doing so is in their best interest.
We’ll discuss subtleties in modeling privacy costs in this situation, along with a simple model and mechanism for eliciting participation.
—Title: Impact of Internet Industry Structure on Revenue and Welfare
What is the impact of the internet industry structure on revenue, return on investment and user welfare? Should a large content provider own the content distribution network and possibly the transit networks? Integrated ownership may improve investment efficiency but what is its impact on user welfare? The presentation investigates such questions by analyzing models of joint production of Internet services.